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# International Offsets: The potential role of the energy sector

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# **The Offset Dilemma**

- Under Waxman-Markey bill, offsets of several stripes are admissible with a high limit on international crediting
- Abatement opportunities internationally are abundant and cheap, but many institutional barriers exist near-term
- In long-term, as support for global stabilization efforts broadens, non-OECD countries will become less willing to export cheap abatement options
- Is there a window of opportunity for offsets?



# **Sources of "Off-System" Compliance**



# **OECD** *Potential* Supply Curves for 2030



# **Non-OECD energy-related CO<sub>2</sub> abatement**



# 70% of abatement occurs in electric sector



### **Details of the Sectoral Mechanism**

• Energy-related offsets must come from a capped *sector* in a participating country under a qualifying agreement

• Cap must be *below BAU*; only reductions beyond the cap can be sold as offsets, market mechanisms are unclear

• Originally conceived for internationally competitive industries (e.g. steel), but electric sector is by far the most important for generating offset trade volume



# Can a deal be negotiated?

China by itself comprises half of non-OECD

• Would China accept an electric-sector cap linked to the US trading system? Or will it continue to pursue its own policy?

 Negotiation (with China or others) must balance host country's political position on burden-sharing with potential financial benefits of offset trade



## **Host Country Economics of Crediting Baseline**



## **China's Electric Sector Emissions**





### **China's Electric Sector Emissions**



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# **Offset Transfers from Non-OECD to OECD**

#### 4 **International policy environment: OECD** import limit 3.5 80% below 1990 by 2050 in OECD 3 (USA + EU + Japan + CANZ) Billion tons CO<sub>2</sub>-e CO<sub>2</sub> from 2.5 W-M scale offset provisions in all OECD China's electric countries sector \$60 2 Expanding CDM for non-CO<sub>2</sub> offsets from 1.5 @\$30 non-OECD 1 • Energy offsets from capped Chinese 0.5 electric sector only Non-CO<sub>2</sub> @ \$15 Current CDM volume 0

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

# **Offset Transfers from Non-OECD to OECD**

### International policy environment:

- 80% below 1990 by 2050 in OECD (USA + EU + Japan + CANZ)
- W-M scale offset provisions in all OECD countries
- Expanding CDM for non-CO<sub>2</sub> offsets from non-OECD
- Energy offsets from capped Chinese electric sector only
- Full potential for global forestry





# **Compliance in OECD with Cap on China Elec.**





# **Compliance in OECD with Full Forestry**





# **US Permit Prices with OECD-only Targets**



## **Impact of Longer Term Global Targets**

- To achieve commonly discussed stabilization targets, all major developing countries must participate
- Currently, targets are "aspirational" only, but they could become a reality in the future
- Consider G8 leaders' goal for an emissions path to 2050 consistent with a 2°C temperature target

50% global reduction below 2000 levels +
80% below for OECD □
20% below for non-OECD

### **Baseline Emissions for Non-OECD**



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### 20% below 2000 = 80% below BAU in 2050



### In G8 scenario, trade flows the other direction



### **US Permit Price in G8 Scenario**



### **Conclusions**

- Energy-related offsets depend on sectoral deals; supply is maximized by loose caps on electric sectors in large countries
- Political economy behind such agreements is complex, could take several years to negotiate
- Even with a successful negotiation, mechanism for selling excess reductions to US compliance parties is not clear
- Ultimately, sectoral caps may be abandoned in favor of national targets as countries join stabilization effort

