



Leakage with Forestry and Agriculture Offset Projects: Issues and Options

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What is Leakage?

- Efforts targeted to reduce emissions in one place simply shift emissions to another location or sector *where they remain uncontrolled or uncounted*.
- Types
 - International: shifting from an uncapped country to a capped country
 - Subnational:
 - Shifting from a capped source to an uncapped source
 - Shifting from an offset project
 - to a source in the same uncapped sector
 - to a source in another uncapped sector









Why Leakage Occurs

- Leakage occurs
 - "whenever the spatial scale of the intervention is inferior to the full scale of the targeted problem" (Wunder 2008)
 - Rules, regulations, and incentives for action affect only part of the potential participants or emissions sources
- Economic forces: Supply/demand supplanted by the project is met elsewhere
 - Formal markets
 - Other institutional arrangements





Leakage as an issue in forestry and agriculture projects

- Leakage is not unique to forest and agriculture projects
- But, features of forestry and agriculture make them susceptible
 - Fixed land base: Land use change has spillover effects
 - Commodity markets are often broad in scope (regional, national, global)



Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions Duke University Example








Afforestation project: agricultural land



Deforestation elsewhere to clear land For agriculture







Why do we care about leakage?

- Erodes the GHG benefits/offset value of a project
- Can be difficult to measure
- Difficult to enforce due to incomplete contracts
- Potential to undermine a projectbased offset system



Does leakage really exist?

✓ Wear and Murray (2004)

Table 9

✓ Evidence: Net effects of federal timber harvests in Pacific Northwest.

- ✓ Harvests elsewhere offset reductions by 84%
- \checkmark Denominated in timber, not carbon

√Wu (2002) – CRP program slippage

328 D. N. Wear, B.C. Murray | Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 47 (2004) 307-330

Leakage effects ^a		
Public harvest timber reductions		
West coast	1200.4	
Inland west	866.8	
Total west	2067.2	
Induced harvests elsewhere		Percent leakage ^b
Western private lands	894.6	43.3%
South	298.9	
US total	1193.5	57.7%
Canada	550.4	
North America total	1744.0	84.4%

^a All quantities are in million board feet, timber scale (1990-1995 annual average).

^bLeakage = Induced harvest in area i divided by total west public harvest reduction.



Predictive Estimates:

Program targeted at specific activities by region

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Land Economics

February 2004

TABLE 2 Avoided Deforestation Leakage Results (All Quantities Are Percentages)

Region	No Harvesting Allowed	Harvesting Allowed	
Pacific Northwest—			
East Side	8.9	7.9	
Northeast	43.1	41.4	
Lake States	92.2	73.4	
Corn Belt	31.5	-4.4	
South-Central	28.8	21.3	

	TABLE 3
Afforestation	Program Leakage Estimates by
Region (All	Quantities Are Percentages)

Region	Leakage Estimate (9	
Northeast	23.2	
Lake States	18.3	
Corn Belt	30.2	
Southeast	40.6	
South-Central	42.5	

Source: Murray et al, Land Economics (2004)





Predictive Estimates: National-scale Programs

Table 6-2: Leakage Estimates by Mitigation Activity at a GHG Price of \$15/t CO₂ Eq.

All quantities	are on an	annualized	basis for	the time p	period 2010	-2110.	

Selected Mitigation Activities	A GHG Effects of Targeted Payment (Tg CO ₂ Eq.)	B Net GHG Effects of All Activities (Tg CO ₂ Eq.)	C Indirect GHG Effects from Nontargeted Activity ^a (Tg CO ₂ Eq.)	D Leakage Rate ^b (%)
Afforestation only	137	104	-33	24.0
Afforestation + forest management	338	348	10	-2.8
Biofuels	84	83	-1	0.2
Agricultural management	230	231	1	-0.1
Agricultural soil carbon	154	145	-9	5.7

^a Indirect effects: C = (B - A).


^b Leakage rate: D = -(C/A) x 100; rounding occurs in table.

Note: Negative leakage rate in D refers to beneficial leakage (i.e., additional mitigation outside the selected activity region, also called positive leakage).



6-6






Leakage Myths

- Leakage is the same as "activity shifting"
 - Only if it causes the emissions to shift outside of the accounting/policy boundaries
- All leakage is bad
 - You can get positive spillover effects (but they seem rarer)
- Leakage does not occur if projects are too small to affect the market price
 - Other way around
 - Small projects don't affect market price because of leakage
 - there are a lot of other market participants who can replace the project's contribution to the market without disruption






What can we do about leakage?

- Ignore it
- Adjust the cap
- Make the cap comprehensive
 - All emissions get counted
 - Nothing leaks
- Minimize through project design
 - Focus offsets on activities with low leakage potential
 - Minimize local leakage through contracts?
- Discount all credits
 - Estimate leakage (e.g., econometrically)/hold back credits
 - Option: true-up ex post with systemwide accounting







Confessions of a Leakage Estimator ...

I'd like to try another way than prediction and discount









- Set aside a leakage buffer for offsets
- Measure net changes nationally
- Reconcile project and national accounts
- Challenge:

Separating out leakage from natural variation of carbon in the system

-Work in progress